Interview : David Feldman by David A. Price
As tuition at both public and private universities has
increased sharply in the past quarter-century — far
faster than the general rate of inflation — the question
of how to pay for undergraduate education has 
become increasingly angst-ridden for students and
their parents. 
How did higher education become so expensive? 
The question calls for systematic economic analysis.
David Feldman and his collaborator Robert Archibald,
both economists at the College of William & Mary,
have sought to provide that analysis in a series of 
articles and in a recent book from Oxford University
Press, Why Does College Cost So Much? 
Feldman has been at William & Mary since arriving
in 1989 from Colgate University as a visiting professor,
a job that he took to be closer to his wife, then a medical
resident at Virginia Commonwealth University Medical
Center in Richmond. His early work focused on 
issues in international trade, macroeconomics, and 
economic history, often combining insights from all
three areas. His research with Archibald on the 
economics of higher education likewise draws upon a
number of subfields, including labor economics, in
addition to the microeconomics of university admis-
sions. David A. Price interviewed Feldman in his office
at William & Mary in December 2010.
RF: Much of your early work was in international trade
and finance. How did you become interested in the 
economics of higher education?
Feldman: My very first paycheck as a tenured member of
the faculty here was reduced in the 1990 statewide pay cut
that the governor authorized. So my first interaction with
being a state employee was having my contract be signed for
one thing, and then having my paycheck be for less, because
the governor just arbitrarily cut state salaries. That was my
introduction to higher education finance and the beginning
of my interest in it. 
I didn’t become a researcher in it right away. But 1990 was
a state budget crisis, and that stimulated all sorts of discus-
sions around here about the appropriate role of the state in
funding higher education. Over the following decade, what
we observed was that state support for universities here 
followed a downward roller coaster trend. When times were
good, the state share would rise back up, but it never quite
got to the level of the last peak. And then the next budget
crisis would come, and state support would fall, and times
would get good, and it would come back up, but 
not quite as much. When I came, the state supplied over 
70 percent of our operating funds, and I think it’s now down
to something in the 30s. That’s a rather startling change in a 
little over 20 years. 
My co-author, Bob Archibald, made the switch before
me; he had started thinking seriously about financial aid. We
actually began our co-authorship not on higher education
issues, but on trade issues. But once he had begun writing
with me, he then began interesting me further in the higher
education side of things. We just got talking, and the rest is
history. 
RF: In the 26 years from 1980 to 2006, the real price of
education has increased more than 100 percent. Some
consider rising tuition to be evidence of irresponsibility
on the part of university administrations. But you found
that during the past half-century, the trend in the real
price of higher education has been very similar to that of
the services of highly educated professionals, such as
physicians and lawyers, including a sharp acceleration in
real prices starting around 1980. How do you account
for that acceleration? 































uFeldman: The acceleration starts
around 1980. What we find, which
won’t come as a surprise to any labor
economist in the country, is that the
acceleration in college costs was
timed almost perfectly to the end of
what Claudia Goldin and Bob Margo
called the “Great Compression” —
the period in which the income dis-
tribution in the United States
became compressed in the middle.
That was a period, basically 1940 to
1980, when the United States was as
middle class a country as it has ever
been. The gap between the 90th per-
centile of the income distribution
and the 10th percentile was as narrow as it had ever been. 
In fact, in the 1970s, that gap continued to narrow, until by
the middle of that decade it was as low as it had been in the
20th century. But starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
a number of things came together to cause the costs of 
colleges and universities — as well as of all industries that
use a significant amount of highly educated labor — to start
to accelerate compared to other things. 
We don’t have anything in particular to add to the story
that labor economists have developed, but we find the most
persuasive explanation is Claudia Goldin and Lawrence
Katz’s race between technology and educational attainment.
Basically, for the first 75 years of the 20th century, the supply
of highly educated people — or changes in the supply of
highly educated people — had outpaced changes in demand.
Due to capital-skill complementarity, the demand for 
highly educated people had been steadily rising over the
course of the century, but for much of the century, the 
supply increased even faster. 
This was the period in which we had the push for uni-
versal high school completion and a skyrocketing increase in
the number of people coming out of colleges and universi-
ties. But in the mid- to late-1970s, attainment stagnated. 
We peaked with the number of people getting high school
degrees at around 75 or 80 percent, and male college comple-
tion rates stagnated. Female college completion rates
continued to rise, but increasing numbers of college-
educated women weren’t going into the labor force. In the
same period, the demand for highly educated people contin-
ued to rise, as it always had, and if anything, the computer
revolution of the past 40 years has accentuated that trend.
So the earnings of people with a college degree, relative
to people with a high school degree, just took off. That’s mir-
rored for people with advanced degrees, the kind of terminal
degrees that college professors, and doctors and lawyers,
have. Any business in which a substantial fraction of its
employee base is highly educated is going to feel these cost
pressures. Some businesses can more easily shed those 
people in favor of machinery or other things, but many of
the personal services industries cannot do that and remain
the kind of services that they 
had been. So you see, in many of
the medical specialties, legal 
specialties, education — all edu-
cation, in fact, not just higher
education — these industries
have seen their cost structure just
accelerate.
RF: Presumably salaries are a
very high share of the overall
costs of a university.
Feldman: Indeed. Some people
have pointed out that faculty
salaries have not risen astronomi-
cally. But often these people look only at salaries, not at
salaries plus benefits. Faculty compensation has increased
considerably since 1980 when you add salaries and benefits
together. 
To some extent a faculty member is not a perfect cog; you
can’t just take a faculty member in the English department
and put him or her to work in investment banking, of course.
But there is a shared labor market, the labor for highly 
educated people. And ultimately changes in the return to
higher education filter through to all degree categories. 
RF: Don’t government subsidies of tuition, such as sub-
sidized student loans, play a role in rising tuition?
Feldman: Oh, they certainly could, and it is the common
wisdom. But two things need to be clarified here. First, even
if it led to a higher list price, it might lead to a lower net price
for students. Second, the whole notion that “it’s all econ 101”
relies on the idea that the supply of higher education is
upward sloping — that in order to get more places available,
universities have to get a higher price for it. Actually, the
bulk of the evidence suggests that this industry is pretty
much a constant-returns-to-scale industry, so the long-run
supply curve is essentially flat. The way we put it in the
book, if you have a university of size 5,000 on one side of the
river and there’s a demand for 5,000 more places for stu-
dents, you can build a university on a vacant piece of land on
the other side of the river, that duplicates everything that
university 1 did, and do that largely without changing the
cost structure. You could provide the same education for
5,000 more students on the other side of the river simply by
duplicating the plan. 
If you look back over the last 50 years, that’s largely
what’s happened. The numbers of students who are being
put through American universities dwarfs the number 40
years ago. And this increased number of places that we have
available for college students has not meant that we’ve slid
along an upward sloping supply curve. We have been able to
build totally new universities and university systems without
affecting cost per student at any given university. So what
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Basically, for the first 75 years
of the 20th century, the supply
of highly educated 
people — or changes in the
supply of highly educated 
people — had outpaced
changes in demand.we’re actually concerned with is the reasons why that flat
supply curve itself is drifting upward over time. That’s the
force for rising costs, this flat supply curve drifting up over
time. What we suggest is that the prime impact of govern-
ment subsidies is not to raise tuition, but to increase the
number of places available. 
RF: Wouldn’t you expect technology to bring pro-
ductivity gains to higher education? Why hasn’t this
happened?
Feldman: Actually, it has. If you look around a university
campus today, you will see many things that look quite dif-
ferent than the way they looked 30 years ago. Technology has
had an impact on higher education that’s basically the same
as the impact it’s had everywhere else. A simple example is
secretaries and typists. If you look around a college campus,
what you will see is that the number of secretaries and typ-
ists in comparison to when I was a student in the 1970s is
way down. When I was a graduate student at Duke, we had
two or three departmental secretaries, and a small army of
typists. Those typists typed my tests, they typed my papers,
they did all my typing for me. We more effectively do much
of our own work that once was done by this army of typists. 
It’s something you observe everywhere in this economy.
The number of people whose job categorization is keyboard
worker or typist has just gone through the floor. It’s in 
higher education, it’s everywhere. That’s the substitution of
relatively low-cost technology for relatively high-cost labor. 
But what we argue is that this is not the dominant way
that technology affects higher education. The primary
impact of technological change in higher education is less on
reducing our costs and more on improving or changing what
we do. To a certain extent, colleges and universities are first
adopters. We tend to be first adopters of new technologies
out there, and we don’t do that because of its cost-reducing
impact. We do it because it’s what our faculty needs in order
to do their research. It’s what our students need in order to
become fully conversant in the new techniques that are
reshaping the work world that they’re going to move into. 
Alot of people tend to think that the impact of technol-
ogy is only in the natural sciences, and this is quite wrong. 
It may be more important in a dollars and cents sense in
physics and chemistry, but new techniques have changed the
way the economics department teaches. Our students 
have to be quite conversant in Stata and SAS and other
econometric packages. People in architecture have to be flu-
ent in computer-assisted design; people in history
departments often have to be familiar with computerized
database analysis that would have been impossible 30 or 40
years ago. So the kinds of techniques that we adopt aren’t
necessarily adopted with an eye to lowering the cost of what
we provide. 
RF: Is it difficult to assess the role of technology in the
cost structure because it has changed the product?
Feldman: Correct — we’re not measuring the same thing.
It’s not as though our output is a pound of potatoes. It’s
almost impossible to measure the value of the output except
retrospectively, many years in the future, looking back at
whether or not we succeeded in preparing students for what
they need to know. 
Our traditional measures of productivity are way too
crude to handle many things, like personal services. Not only
that, we’re a multiproduct firm: We produce research, we
produce public service, we produce graduates at the under-
grad and grad level. 
RF: There’s a popular perception, at least, that workers
in the for-profit sector are working harder today than
they were 20 or 30 years ago, and that this trend has
passed academia by. Do you think that’s true?
Feldman: There may be something to it if you go back 60
years. But over the last 20 or 30 years, no. I don’t think that’s
a very accurate thing to say. There is no good data that sup-
port the often politicized perception that faculty members
don’t do any work — that faculty members teach six to nine
hours a week, and twiddle their thumbs for the rest of the day. 
If you want to look at evidence, you need to go to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, for instance, and look at the
establishment survey, or other data sources, on the average
workweek for the economy as a whole. If you actually go and
look at data on the average workweek, over the last 30 years,
it has fallen: from about 38 to 39 hours per week to 34 to 35
hours per week, among workers in general. So the idea that
the higher education sector is inherently full of lazy, unmoti-
vated people and the private sector is full of dedicated
people working ever longer hours doesn’t seem to be borne
out at all in the actual national data. 
The data we have suggest that as the nation has become
more affluent over long stretches of time, 40 to 50 years,
people have taken part of that affluence in the form of 
higher leisure, so shorter workweeks. Those are the facts. 
RF: Does the institution of tenure reduce faculty 
productivity?
Feldman:Tenure is a very complicated subject. I think a lot
of people think about tenure using the quaint old story
about academic freedom. But I think most economists 
actually look at tenure as an economic institution. It’s a way
of solving a set of incentive problems that are out there. One
of the problems is that you have faculty members who are
being asked by universities to specialize in something that’s
fairly narrow. One thing that gives the faculty member the
incentive to do what the university wants, which is risky spe-
cialized research ventures, is the security that if the world
turns against them 10 years from now — they’re looking at
problem Y, and problem Y stops being important or gets
solved — the faculty member isn’t just dismissed while
they’re trying to retool to solve problem X. So in a sense,
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that it helps faculty members to
invest in risky ventures that are of
value to the university. 
Does tenure raise costs? I think it
actually reduces costs. Tenure is com-
pensation in a nonmonetary form as
opposed to in a monetary form.
Other things equal, if you give a 
person job security, part of that is in
lieu of a higher salary. 
RF: You write about the decline in
what is called “state effort” —
appropriations per $1,000 in 
personal income — in support of
state universities. You found that
on average, state effort has gone
down 40 percent from its peak in
the 1970s. Yet state budgets gener-
ally have soared during that time.
Why has higher education’s share of state spending been
shrinking so much?
Feldman: That’s a complicated issue as well. And a lot of
people have weighed in on it. Clearly the first place to look
is at what states are actually spending their money on. Those
categories are ones like corrections, Medicaid, roads, and 
K-12 education. These are things that are muscling higher
education out of the budget. 
Over the past 35 years, states have shown that they are far
more willing to endure the political problems that come
with allowing tuition to go up than they are willing to endure
the political problems that come from raising taxes.
Increasing taxes: anathema. Increasing tuition: bad, but not
as anathema as raising taxes. And unlike things like the 
prisons, you can’t charge the prisoners for their rent. But you
can charge the college students for their education. So states
have found it more palatable to allow universities to cover
more and more of their increasing costs by direct charges to
families, rather than cough up additional state revenues in
order to keep those charges down. 
This is not a Virginia issue, this is nationwide. The 
pattern of declining state effort is nationwide.
RF: Has undergraduate education become a more
national market than it was a generation ago? 
Feldman: Much more so, yes. At the average university —
this is true at public universities, it’s true at private universi-
ties — if you look at the percentage of the student body 
that comes from within the state, it’s gone down. The 
percentage of out-of-state students has gone up. Or if you
look at it differently, if you look at the number of students
who come from with a certain radius, not just within state, 
but just miles, schools now have to compete with schools 
that are farther away. 
If you were to go back 40 or 50
years, for instance, and look at a par-
ticular geographic area, the number
of schools that effectively had that
market was fairly small. Each of
those schools today has much less
market power within that market.
Two things tended to lock students
into their more local network: One
was transportation and the other was
information. Transportation and
information are now both very cheap
in comparison to what they were 40
or 50 years ago. What that means is
that people have the luxury of taking
a wider view. And when they do that,
it means that any given school,
instead of having two or three or four
other competitors, now has 20, 30,
40 other competitors.
RF: Students can look at universities farther away …
Feldman: I’ve got a 17-year-old who’s doing that as we speak!
RF: …and universities can look at students who are 
farther away. What has this meant? 
Feldman: One of the things that it does is create better
matching. Students can find a finer match for what they
want than they could in years past, when both information
and transportation were much more expensive. 
But there are other aspects. One of the things that we’ve
observed is that the nationalization of the market has led to
increased prosperity of the elite. Instead of Harvard, Yale,
and Princeton competing for the best of the Northeast, we
have Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, oh, and Stanford, com-
peting for the best of the nation. So what we have observed
at our most elite universities is that their selectivity has gone
up over time. There’s debate about what’s happened to selec-
tivity at the rest, but there’s not a whole lot of debate about
selectivity at the elite. The elite are now more selective 
than they have ever been. So there’s a concentration of 
talent that has occurred as the best students who used to go
to largely regional universities now can aspire to Harvard,
Yale, Princeton, and the better small liberal arts programs. 
RF: Now that higher education is a national market, do
you see it becoming a more global market? 
Feldman: It has become global. And many of the same
forces that I’ve just been talking about in the national 
market are also driving the internationalization. Somebody
from Shanghai or Bogota can aspire to go to school at the
University of Kansas, or Yale, for two reasons: The cost of
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and Southern Economic Journaltransportation has gone down, and the cost of information
has gone down, so they, too, can look beyond the national
university system of their country. At the same time, the
American university system has for many years been the gold
standard. 
Likewise, the demand for education — it may be an
investment, but it’s an investment where there’s a big cost.
In the United States, it can be financed by borrowing. It’s
much less easy for somebody in the developing world to
access capital markets and borrow for an education. As
incomes have increased in various parts of the developing
world, a class of people has developed who can actually
finance that education in advance, in cash. So clearly, the
development of the oil economy in many parts of the world,
the development of an elite in many parts of the world, have
led to families with enough income and assets that they can
buy an American education by writing a check. This is a
group of people that is adding to the pool of aspirants who
want to get in. So we’re already there. 
The U.S. higher education system is still the most 
welcoming to outsiders. We speak English! How many 
foreigners in China are going to choose to go to a German-
speaking university in Germany? There are some; I’ve met
them, actually. But the numbers who have the German lan-
guage skills, or the Italian language skills, or the French
language skills, are very small in comparison to the numbers
who have English language skills. So the demand for coming
to the United States and Great Britain is quite high. 
RF: Do you think there are other countries that offer a
better model than ours for structuring the system of
higher education here?
Feldman: I don’t know that I want to make a complete
declarative statement, yes or no. Different systems of higher
education have different advantages and disadvantages. On
balance, I think ours works better than most other systems
do, for many reasons. Here’s one that I really like to high-
light: We have a system of higher education that is the best
in the world at giving people second and third chances. I
don’t think that’s a benefit to be underestimated. There are
an awful lot of people in this world who don’t grow up until
they’re 25, and in the United States it’s very easy for them 
to go back to school. In Germany, if you are not college
material when you’re 11, then you don’t get tracked into the
“gymnasium.” It’s very, very difficult for you to move into the
elite in German society. 
Ours is a much more individual-based system. Somebody
who was a hamburger flipper at McDonald’s who says, 
“This is a dead end, I don’t want to do this the rest of my
life,” simply takes the savings that they’ve squirreled away
and goes to a two-year community college and gets the skills,
and then decides whether or not to transfer those skills to a
local university and get their four-year degree. We have a lot
more flexibility in our system than in most other systems 
in the world, and I think that’s of great value.
RF: Let’s talk about international trade in general for a
moment. As you know, international trade as a share of
GDP declined far more sharply during the latest reces-
sion than in past recessions. What is going on there?
Feldman: I wish I could tell you! I don’t know. This is not
your garden-variety recession. This is not an inventory-
driven process; this is driven by financial market meltdowns
and financial market uncertainty. And I would venture to
speculate that a recession driven by those two things 
probably affects trans-border contracts and trading more
than it does internal ones — for many reasons, one of them
having to do with risk. If you increase the risk of foreign
investment, if you increase the risk of contracting with 
foreigners with products in their currency, for instance, and
there is a real risk of significant ruptures in currency values,
what you do is you create home-market bias. You make the
risk of dealing internally within your own borders low 
compared to the risk of dealing externally with foreigners. 
So I would imagine that one of the things that you would
observe is that an increasing home bias would tend to dimin-
ish the relative importance of trade and economic activity.
That’s just a guess.
RF: Who were your main influences in your develop-
ment as an economist?
Feldman: On the personal side of things, when I was a
young professor at Colgate, we hired a guy from the
University of Pennsylvania named Robert Margo, one of the
premier economic historians in the country. I was just 
learning the business, and he was the one who essentially
helped me to understand how to think about research 
questions, how to pose an interesting question, how to 
think about managing a question, how to think about 
modeling and forming questions that a reasonable person
could test. 
In parallel to that, the other influence is my thesis 
adviser, Ed Tower. Tower’s influence was to show me the
value of probing deeply. Most thesis advisers are not hands-
on. It’s, “Hey, come back in three months time when you’ve
got three-quarters of it to show me.” That wouldn’t have
worked for me. And fortunately, that’s not how Ed Tower
worked. Ed Tower wanted to talk to you at breakfast every
week. “So what are you thinking about?” And we would have
a conversation. And he would ask questions, and push, 
basically until you would give up and say “uncle.” That would
teach you exactly what you didn’t know, and where your
modeling, where your intellectual apparatus was just not
grappling with the problem. So those are two personal influ-
ences who helped me to understand what it means to be a
professional economist.  RF
Editor’s Note: Our originally scheduled interview with 
Joel Slemrod of the University of Michigan will appear in the
next issue.
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